MYTHBUSTER Was former Super Eagles boss Lars Lagerback a fraud?

Mythbuster is a series that critically fact-checks preconceived footballing notions and myths. This edition examines the perception of former Nigeria coach Lars Lagerback as inept.

Nigeria have been present at six editions of the FIFA World Cup, a record only bettered on the African continent by Cameroon. 

While, from a statistical perspective, 2002 – in which the Super Eagles only managed a goal and a point – stands as their most disappointing outing, 2010 is certainly the most forgettable. Helmed by Lars Lagerback, Nigeria failed to win a game and accrued a lone point over the course of three matches in South Africa.

There is a common thread running through both 2002 and 2010, of course: both were preceded by the dismissal of Shaibu Amodu following third-place finishes at the Africa Cup of Nations. However, the choice of replacement was vastly different. Whereas in 2002 the Super Eagles were handed over to Adegboye Onigbinde as a stop-gap, in 2010 a sizable investment was made to install Lagerback.

The subsequent underperformance, in what seemed like a manageable group (unlike in 2002 when, by all accounts, Nigeria were drawn in the tournament’s ‘Group of Death’) is, for many, definitive proof of the ineptitude of the Swede. In the reckoning of Super Eagles coaches of all time, Lagerback would, for most, figure near the bottom.

How accurate is this judgement?

Setting the scene

By way of establishing the facts, it is worth understanding the context of Lagerback’s appointment in the first place.

Following the sacking of Amodu, a typically scattergun process kicked off to appoint a replacement in time for the World Cup. An initial shortlist of six was whittled down to three, as the likes of Louis van Gaal, Giovanni Trapattoni and Guus Hiddink recused themselves. A fourth name was then added to the mix – Lagerback, Peter Taylor, Ratomir Dujkovic and Bruno Metsu were invited to a meeting, ostensibly a pre-interview, in London. 

After conducting interviews in Abuja in February, the choice essentially came down to two: Lagerback or former England manager Glenn Hoddle. In the end, the former was chosen amid allegations by Hoddle of kick-back requests; Director General of the National Sports Commission, Patrick Ekeji, explained the decision thus: “During the interview session, Lagerback impressed with his developmental plans, which Hoddle did not have.”

The Swede was promptly handed a five-month contract.

The counterargument(s)

While 2010 was one of only two instances of Nigeria failing to win a game at a World Cup, the case against Lagerback is chiefly built on two pieces of evidence: style of play, and his use of players in unnatural positions (to the detriment of the team).

Both are valid points of criticism. With the best of wills, the Super Eagles were far from swashbuckling, and it cannot have helped that certain players were utilised in unfamiliar roles. However, in both cases, there exist cogent, logical rationalisations that, if taken into account, cast Lagerback in a less unflattering light.

In a way, both can broadly be caveated by the same reality: at the point of Lagerback’s appointment, there were only 107 days until Nigeria's opening game at the World Cup. That duration left only one international window open for preparatory friendlies, and roughly three weeks within which to camp from the end of the European club season. 

Needless to say, this was an inadequate timeframe within which to institute complex systems, and so Lagerback rightly focused on drilling shape and distances, defensive principles being easier to train and assimilate. “My area of concern now is the defence because the defenders easily lose concentration,” he told SuperSport. “This is what I have seen in recent videos of Eagles' games.”

It was this concern that drove an already beige manager to adopt a functional system built on straight lines: out went Amodu’s 4-3-3 with the ‘trivote’ in midfield, and in came a solid 4-4-2 that sought to form two banks of four without the ball and attack quickly into the channels when in possession.

It largely worked: Nigeria only conceded once from open play in the tournament with 11 men on the pitch, and were praised by the FIFA Technical Report for their “compact defence”. Their distances were good, testifying to a well-drilled system, as was their overall organisation out of possession. There was, undeniably, a shortcoming in terms of attacking play due to the lack of players suited to playing between lines, however.

It is worth noting at this point that dour football was not imported by Lagerback; the same complaint had been levied against Amodu in the lead-up to his sacking. And while the Swede clearly had a defensive emphasis coming in, it cannot have helped that he was unable to call upon, in Mikel John Obi, Nigeria’s most expansive midfielder, a luxury that his predecessor enjoyed.

His weak profiling of players is partly explained by a lack of familiarity (again, a consequence of having been hired virtually last minute), but also had a lot to do with the options available to him. Due to a lack of proper wingers in the national team, it was necessary to make some concessions for balance. 

To make fielding the likes of Chinedu Obasi, Osaze Odemwingie and Kalu Uche – all naturally forwards – tenable as wide men in a 4-4-2 shape, there needed to be a defensive counterweight on the other flank. That player was Sani Kaita, a holding midfielder who was a good tackler and runner, but was limited in his use of the ball.

This provides a rationale for Kaita playing out wide, and injuries – to both Taye Taiwo and Elderson Echiejile – explain the deployment of Rabiu Afolabi at left-back for the final group match against Korea.

Verdict

Not guilty. In fact, there is a case to be made that Lagerback was, on the whole, unlucky.

Had Mikel been available, the erstwhile Chelsea man would have no doubt provided the guile in possession that was so sorely missing. (In this respect, prospective replacement Haruna Lukman proved a huge disappointment.)

Had Sani Kaita not gotten sent off against Greece, in a game that Nigeria were controlling and comfortable in, it is not a stretch to see Nigeria winning that. 

As it turned out, the Super Eagles were forced to play over 70 minutes a man light; following the sending-off, Greece boss Otto Rehaggel took off a defender for a striker, and slowly the 2004 European champions took charge of the proceedings. And even then, it took the treacherous Jabulani and a handling error from Vincent Enyeama to hand them the victory.

Had Yakubu Aiyegbeni converted from less than six yards out against Korea, how differently might things have turned out? In the end, even FIFA decried Nigeria’s “profligacy in front of goal”, “inexplicable errors” and “serious failure to convert goalscoring opportunities”.

The circumstances of his appointment may have been ill-advised and the football may have been far from electrifying, but his work, purely from a coaching perspective, was solid.

Disagree? Well, in 2016, Lagerback qualified Iceland for the European Championship (ahead of Turkey and the Netherlands) for the first time in that nation’s history, and led them to the last eight, beating Austria and England along the way. 

Not bad for a fraud with no clue, eh?

• The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position of Pulse Sports